Approved For Release 2008/08/15 : CIA-RDP80-00810A006200280005-1 SECRET REPORT CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INFORMATION REPORT CD NO. 25X1 COUNTRY DATE DISTR. 24 March 1955 East Germany SUBJECT NO. OF PAGES SED Doubts as tp Soviet Policy on Germany PLACE NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW) **ACQUIRED** 25X1 DATE OF SUPPLEMENT TO INFO. REPORT NO. THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 16, SECTIONS 709 AND 794, OF THE U. S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVEL-ATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED. 25X1 THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION 25X1 it was learend that the SED Politburo had asked the East German government delegation to the Moscow security conference to express its concern over the Kremlin's German policy. It was feared by the Politburo that the USSR in its attempt to 25X1 establish a status of peaceful coexistence between the Eastern and Western camps might be inclined to sacrifice the GDR and the SED if this proved necessary. 2. The SED Politburo, which seems to be convinced that the Paris agreements will be ratified, believes the implementation of these pacts and the reunification of Germany are incompatible. It therefore demands extensive security measures along the he one hand, and Albert Schreiner and ex-Figother in Dresden in October 1954 This problem was discussed between Molotov & other in Dresden in October 1954. On that occasion Molotov promised much more financial help for the enlargement of the KVP than was conceded at the Moscow conference after Poland and Czechoslovakia had protested against an excessive rearmament of East Germany. 3. The distrust of the SED Politburo in the Kremlin's foreign policies was further nourished by the fact that the importance of the Saar problem was played down in Moscow. The German delegation had suggested that the betrayal of the Saar by Adenauer should be given wide publicity in the propagenda campaign against the rearmament of West Germany. This, was, however, rejected by the Soviets, who held that the ratification of the Paris agreements was not to be interpreted as preventing the reunification of Germany for good. The formula imposed by the Soviets for propaganda activities was that the ratification of these treaties would postpone the reunification for many years. Comment. The report throws significant light on the uncertainties 25X1 existing in leading SED circles regarding the Kremlin's German policy. It a pears that the Soviets do not want to take a definite stand in this they wish to retain a trump eard for pensible East-West DISTRIBUTION NAVY X NSRB STATE X FBI 25X1 ARMY AIR Approved For Release 2008/08/15: CIA-RDP80-00810A006200280005-1



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- 2. The SED Politburo, which seems to be convinced that the Paris agreements will be ratified, believes the implementation of these pacts and the reunification of Germany are incompatible. It therefore demands extensive security measures along the zonal boundaries. This problem was discussed between Molotov and Petr N. Pospelov on the one hand, and Albert Schreiner and ex-Field Marshal Paulus on the other in Dresden in October 1954. On that occasion, Molotov promised much more financial help for the enlargement of the KVP than was conceded at the Moscow conference after Poland and Czechoslovakia had protested against an excessive rearmament of East Germany.
- 3. The distrust of the SED Politbüro in the Kremlin's foreign policies was further nourished by the fact that the importance of the Saar problem was played down in Moscow. The German delegation had suggested that the betrayal of the Saar by Adenauer should be given wide publicity in the propagenda campaign against the rearmament of West Germany. This was, however, rejected by the Soviets, who held that the ratification of the Paris agreements was not to be interpreted as preventing the reunification of Germany for good. The formula imposed by the Soviets for propaganda activities was that the ratification of these treaties would postpone the reunification for many sease.

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